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Abstract 
Tire manufacturers such as Michelin and Goodyear sell their new and retread tire on 
their stores. Alternatively, there are independent dealers that also sell the similar retread 
product via their own channels. In a two-player game theory, increasing one’s profit 
would result in decreasing the other. This research demonstrates how to find profits by 
changing price position of retread tire from an OEM and the 3rd party dealer. Profit 
function bases on price and relative perceived quality to the new product. The simulation 
results show that mutual profit of both parties is improved by introducing retread tire, 
however, price competition from individual profit maximization prevents both parties to 
set the price point that maximize their mutual profits. 
Keywords: Market Segmentation, Price Analysis, Remanufactured Products, Retread Tire, Rev
erse Supply Chain. 
1. INTRODUCTION
The lifespan of tire is longer than the 
period that the first owner replace it. The used
 tire can be repaired and reused for budget tra
nsportation. Additionally, wear off tire could 
be retread by replacing the old rubber layer wi
th new one. Retread tire off a reasonable alter
native to the new one and it is environmental 
friendly because this method can save up to 8
0% of the tire material cost (Debo and Van W
assenhove [1]). A tire can be retread up to five
 times. We can foresee a tremendous number 
of used products in the market. Similarly, in f
ood industry that product value decrease over 
time, price of nearly expired product must be 
adjusted in order to attract customer and be so
ld before losing its value.  
In this research, we demonstrate how 
to set a price of two different type of retread p
roduct from two main used-product sellers in 
the market, an original equipment manufactur
er (OEM) and a dealer. We name retread prod
ucts which are sold by original owners via co
mmon dealer as general used products (GRP).
 On the other hand, the other portion of used p
roducts from consumer or product rental com
panies are purchased by the OEM then are ins
pected, repaired and tested by OEMs standard
 until the quality of meets the standard. We cal
l these certified retread products (CRP). Exam
ples of OEM that resell their retread products 
are Michelin and Goodyear while examples of
 the 3rd party company who sell their retread t
ire are kaltire.com and tirerecappers.com. The
se two players compete in the retread tire mar
ket by the quality and price differentiation. In 
line with Vorasayan and Ryan [2], we use a w
ord “perceived quality” to represent   i.e. 
performance, warranty period, seller’s reputat
ion. The actual performance of each retread pr
oduct can be varied and cannot be evaluated b
y historical information such as production da
te or physical appearance. Average consumer 
without in-depth knowledge on rubber and tir
e could not tell the performance differences b
y just having a short test drive. Therefore, war
ranty and seller reputation are key factors in c
ustomer confidence in retread product. CRP c
ome with technology and warrantee from the 
OEM. Consumer, thus, perceive that it has hig
her quality than typical retread products and a
re willing to buy it with higher price. Profit m
argin and quantity of sales are surviving facto
rs. In general, both parties are not cooperative
 and want to maximize their own profits. High
er profit for one party could results in lesser p
rofit from the other. How can we find the pric
e that satisfies both parties in this two-player 
game? How much total profit would be impro
ved if both parties cooperate and agree to shar
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e a fair proportion of mutual profit? 
Studying resells of remanufactured go
ods can be categorized under the market segm
entation in closed-loop supply chain where ite
m has been redistributed to consumer more th
an one time. It received great attention in the 
past 10 years due to cost saving and natural c
onservation (Drake and Furguson, [3]). The st
udy by Hauser and Lund [4] explained that pri
ce differentiation of remanufactured products 
come from the variations in warranties, produ
ct inspection points, and other program comp
onents. This incidence implies that customer n
eeds to choose the program, hence, price that 
ally with his/her expectation. Debo [5] and Jin
 et. al. [6] presents a consumer profile functio
n for new and remanufactured products. Subra
manyam and Subramanyam [7] studies motiv
ation and satisfaction of buyers after buying p
re-owned products from ebay.com. They foun
d that satisfaction from buying pre-owned pro
ducts does not necessarily lower than from bu
ying new products. The study also states price
 difference between new and pre-owned prod
ucts based largely on seller reputation and war
ranty period. Oraiopoulos [8] shows that 77% 
of information technology companies buy pre
-owned products and 46% of these companies
 continually increase their budgets for pre-ow
ned products in the next fiscal year.  
In this paper, we develop a 
mathematical model for multiple qualities of 
products 1) new, 2) certified retread with 
warrantee by the OEM, and 3) noncertified 
retread tire by 3rd parties. The model consists 
of price, quality, cost and demand to give an 
insight of how the optimal price position 
under cooperative and non-cooperative 
schemes.   
2. METHOD
The valuation of consumer in the market 
�𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)�   is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed with parameter [a,b] i.e. if we sort 
consumers from their purchasing power, the 
difference in purchasing power is constant. a 
and b are minimum and maximum price for 
used product in the market. When 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛  ≤  a, 
every prospect consumer in the market will 
buy new product. In contrast, when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 > b, all 
consumer will not buy it. When simplify [a,b] 
to [0,1]. At 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 = 0.3, it implies that 70% of 
prospect consumers in the market have 
valuation more than 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛  and will buy new 
products if there is no other alternative. Other 
notations are  
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛  = price of a new tire 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 = price of a certified retread tire 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 = price of a noncertified retread tire 
𝜆𝑛𝑛  = demand for new tire 
𝜆𝑢𝑢1 = demand for certified retread tire 
𝜆𝑢𝑢2 = demand for noncertified retread tire 
𝛿𝛿1 = perceived quality of certified 
retread tire 
𝛿𝛿2 = perceived quality of noncertified 
retread tire 
𝑣  = valuation of a consumer,   
𝑐𝑛𝑛 = cost of a new tire 
𝑐𝑢𝑢1 = cost of a certified retread tire 
𝑐𝑢𝑢2 = cost of a noncertified retread tire 
Let quality of a brand-new tire equals to 
1. 𝛿𝛿1  and 𝛿𝛿2  are quality of certified and
noncertified products are  respectively where 
0 < 𝛿𝛿2 < 𝛿𝛿1 < 1. Valuation is assumed to be 
direct proportional to perceived quality. For 
example if valuation for a new product is 𝑣 
then valuation for certified and noncertified 
products are 𝛿𝛿1𝑣 and 𝛿𝛿2𝑣  respectively. 
Demand function can be derived by these 
logical expressions. 
1. Consumer will buy a new product if
1.1 𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 > 0 and
1.2 𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 > 𝛿𝛿1𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 and
1.3 𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 > 𝛿𝛿2𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2












� ≤ 1      
and, 






� .  
Then, maximum prices of retread products are 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝑏(1 − 𝛿𝛿1) > 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1      (1) 
and 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝑏(1 − 𝛿𝛿2) > 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 (2) 
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2. Consumer will buy a certified retread
product if  
2.1 𝛿𝛿1𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 > 0 and 
2.2 𝛿𝛿1𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 > 𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 and 
2.3 𝛿𝛿1𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 > 𝛿𝛿2𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 




� ≤ 𝜆𝑢𝑢1 <
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑢1
1−𝛿1





� ≤ 1 
therefore, 








𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 < 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛   (3) 
3. Consumer will buy a noncertified
retread product if 
3.1 𝛿𝛿2𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 > 0 
3.2 𝛿𝛿2𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 > 𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 
3.3 𝛿𝛿2𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 > 𝛿𝛿1𝑣 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 
or 𝑃𝑢2
𝛿2














In order to have 𝜆𝑢𝑢2 > 0,  
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 < 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛   (4) 
For i type of a product sold, assuming all 
demands are met, profit is 𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑃𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖). We 
find the optimal prices of retread tires to 
maximize profit under 3 schemes. 
1) Profit for an individual party with no
competition.
2) Mutual profit of OEM and the 3rd
party dealer.
3) Mutual profit of OEM and the 3rd
party dealer with competition.
In the situation that there are demands and 
profits for all types of products, minimum and 
maximum values of variables 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1,𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 are 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑖,𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 − (1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑖)� ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑖 ≤ 𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,  
𝑖 = 1,2  
and 




 We simulated perceived quality of 
retread product so than the average perceived 
quality of certified product is 80.1% of the 
brand new product. The average price for a 
noncertified retread tire is 72.8%. Hence, we 
set the 𝛿𝛿1 = 0.84 and 𝛿𝛿2 = 0. 8.  
 Price of a brand-new product (𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛) is set 
to 0.5. At this price, 50% of consumers see 
value of the product more than its price so 
they would buy it if there is no other 
alternative. Cost parameters are adjusted 
proportional to 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛  however real cost of all 
parties are still unclear since cost of 
purchasing retread tire can be varied 
depending on consumer’s willingness to sell, 
negotiation skills and market situations. Let 
our initial cost parameters be 𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 0.40, 𝑐𝑢𝑢1 = 
0.25 and 𝑐𝑢𝑢2 = 0.21. This is the case where 
gross margin from selling new is in the 
middle between maximum and minimum 
profit margin from selling retread tire, 
specifically  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 − 𝑐𝑢𝑢2) < 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 −
𝑐𝑢𝑢1) < 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑛𝑛 < 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 − 𝑐𝑢𝑢1) <
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 − 𝑐𝑢𝑢2). 
 We first shows the optimal 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 for OEM 
where noncertified product is not present. In 
Figure. 1, we can see there are 2 local optima 
separated by a line indicating demands for 
new products. Profits on the left are from 𝜆𝑢𝑢1 
only while profit on the right comes from 
demands from both kinds of products. The 
optimal 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1  is 0.377. For instance, a brand 
new product cost 20,000 THB therefore the 
optimal price of certified retread tire in this 
case is 20,000
0.5
0.377 = 15,080 THB 
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Figure. 1 Profit of OEM from selling new and 
certified products in no the 3rd party dealer 
scheme 
In the case with no certified products, 
profit of the dealer as concave respect to the 
price. The price that maximize noncertified 
products is P_u2= 0.2975 or 11,900 THB as 
shown in Figure 2. 
Figure. 2 Profit of the dealer from selling 
noncertified products under in no certified 
products scheme 
For 2 variables, the mutual profit is 
presented by contour plot of profit as a 
function of 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1  and 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2  as in Figure 3. The 
vertical and horizontal white lines are 
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑢1
1−𝛿1
= 1 and  𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑢2
1−𝛿2
= 1 respectively. The 
area inside these lines is where 𝜆𝑛𝑛 > 0. The 
brighter tone indicates the more profit. The 










. The area on the left of upper diagonal 
is where there is no demand for noncertified 
while the area on the right of lower diagonal 
is where there is no demand for certified 
products. Consequently, there are demands 
for both in the middle area. 
When both parties are cooperating, 
we can see 2 local optima. One (point Y) is in 
an area where no demand for new product and 
the other one is in the area with demands for 
both new and retread products (point X). At 
point X, the maximum mutual total profits if 
OEM and the 3rd party dealer are co-operated 
are achieved by setting 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 = 0.377 or 15,080 
THB and 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 = 0.336 or 13,440 THB. It is in 
the area where demands for new and both 
kinds of retread products are presented. At 
this point, total demands for all products 
increased to 56.36% compared with 50% 
when there are no retread tire in the market. 
The market shares for new, certified and 
noncertified retread tire are 41%, 32% and 
27% or 23%, 18% and 15% of market size 
respectively. 
Figure 4 and 5 shows 2 distinct 
contour graphs of profit from OEM and the 
3rd party dealer. As in Figure. 1 and 2, 
OEM’s profit is maximized when 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 = 
0.377 (Point A). The 3rd party dealer’s profit 
is maximized when 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 = 0.2975 (Point B). 
We can see that the optimal point of each 
party is not in the same region thus it cannot 
be mutually optimized. When these 2 parties 
are not cooperating, the optimal prices can be 
situational. For example, the optimal point in 
cooperative case (point X) is not equilibrium 
point. Either party will get profit boost by 
lowering his product price. Combined with 
reason such as excess inventory. 3rd party 
dealer decided to lower  𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2  down to raise 
demand to match his supplies and increase the 
profit. He lowers 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 down to 0.33 or 13,200 
THB. At this point, the demand for 3rd party 
retread tire raised from 15% to 24% of the 
market. On the other hand, because of the 
price reduction, demand of recertified product 
declined from 18% to 9%. OEM, supposedly, 
with retread products supply of 18% of the 
market, is enforced to lower 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1  down to 
regain his market share. However, he has to 
be cautious about reducing 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 because it will 
again negatively affect 𝜆𝑢𝑢2 that will leads to 
another reduction in prices. If price reduction 
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all parties has zero profit. So, the optimal 
price should not be at the extreme points 
where demands of either retread product is 
zero. Both parties have to find the acceptable 
balance between inventory cost and profit 
margin in order to maintain reasonable 
profits. In this particular case, OEM might 
decide to lower price down only slightly to 
gain some of his demand for retread tire back. 
At point D, 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢1 = 0.375 or 15,000 THB and 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢2 =  0.330 or 13,320 THB that leads  to 
reasonable demands for both retread products 
are  𝜆𝑢𝑢1 = 14% and 𝜆𝑢𝑢2 = 21%. At this point, 
the OEM lose profit by 4.25% while 3rd party 
dealer gain profit by 9.32%.  The equilibrium 
prices of both retread tire can be found in 
Point F but it is unlikely to reach the point 
where both parties lose 50% of profits from 
point X and OEM sell only retread tires.  
Figure. 3 Mutual profits of the OEM and the 
3rd party dealer from selling new and retread 
tire 
Figure. 2 Profits of the OEM from selling 
new and certified pre-owned tires 
Figure. 3 Profit of the 3rd party dealer. 
Profits in Fig. 3, 4 and 5 base on 
estimate cost which might not be true. The 
less cost, the more possible profit and it 
would lead to lower optimal prices. The 
model itself still needs modification in order 
to find applicable optimal points. In practice, 
the uniform purchasing power is rather not a 
good representative of the market. The 
distribution of income might have positive 
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income buyers is less than low income 
buyers. Factors such as store brand, store 
location, affect buyer perceived qualities and 
lead to different prices. On the reseller side, 
holding cost of used product, inventory level, 
the release date of coming new model, new 
product backorders are also related to product 
prices. The optimal prices are also related to 
the assigned values of quality of used 
products. In example, they are relatively high 
due to assumption in demand function. That 
probability distribution of qualities could be 
subject for future study. 
CONCLUSION 
We develop a mathematical model to 
determine prices of used products sold from 2 
parties, OEM and the 3rd party dealer. The 
retread tire from OEM has higher perceived 
quality because of brand reputation and 
loyalty of customer. Noncertified product 
from the 3rd party dealer, on the other hand, 
competes with lower price. Under cooperative 
scheme, local optimal prices could be found 
numerically. The global optimum and 
equilibrium were found heuristically. In non-
cooperative scheme, maximize profit in one 
party will lower profit of the other down. 
Both parties need to settle for satisfactory 
profit rather than continuously cutting prices 
down to retain profitable business. The 
market of remanufactured product is not 
limited to retread tire but any agricultural 
products that have as well as consumer and 
electronics products that have been 
refurbished or repaired to a certain quality 
relative to new product quality. With 
competitive prices, certified remanufactured 
products could give higher consumer surplus 
than other alternatives. It could leads to lower 
overall material consumption. 
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